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The Most Insignificant Justice:
Further Evidence
Frank H. Easterbrookt
Professor David Currie's seminal1 study of the insignificance
of members of the Supreme Court2 raises more questions than it
answers.3 Did Justice Duval[1]4 ever concur without opinion?5 Did
the Justices display the same patterns in private law cases, or in
privateer cases, as in constitutional cases? The masters of quiet
observation in constitutional matters may have been biding their
time and saving their influence, the better to dominate their
Brethren in land tenure disputes. Did any of the candidates leave a
significant, and thus disqualifying, legacy of influential opinions in
any field? Professor Currie's narrow focus on constitutional deci-
sions may obscure rather than illuminate the broader patterns of
insignificance.
In reading Professor Currie's work, I became concerned that
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago, a title I shall not be able to keep if I write
many more articles in this vein. I am indebted to R.H. Helmholz for pointing out a spelling
error in an earlier draft. Several of my other colleagues offered similarly helpful advice
about this project-most often to publish it under someone else's name-but as usual I
disregard their sage counsel. The Law and Economics Program of the University of Chicago
Law School provided no support for the research and writing of this article and is not re-
sponsible for any of the conclusions expressed here. Neither am I.
It is customary to call things you like "seminal," and I follow that convention here, if
only because seminal seemed more hopeful than "terminal."
2 Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
466 (1983).
3 It may not answer any questions, but the clich6 in the text is mandatory when dealing
with seminal studies.
' I use the form Duval[l] because Currie's discussion, supra note 2, at 468, did not
persuade me that Duvall, or for that matter Duval, is the proper spelling. Although most of
the Court's Reporters listed the man as Duvall, Peters started out with Duval, see 1 Pet. xi
(1828), before switching to Duvall, see 2 Pet. ix (1829). The practice varied from edition to
edition. The original report of The Atalanta, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 409, 433 (1818), states that
"Mr. Justice TODD and Mr. Justice DuvALL did not sit in this cause," but the second edition
of the report changes this to "Mr. Justice TODD and Mr. Justice DuvAL did not sit in this
cause." Perhaps Duval[l]'s literary executor, lacking anything to do, tried to set the record
straight but, because LEXIS had not yet been invented, could not find all occurrences of the
name. Perhaps, too, there were really two separate people, a Duvall and a Duval, who took
turns sitting quietly on the Court in order to confuse historians. I see no need to resolve
these questions, and so I use Duval[l] throughout.
5 On this important question, see the last entry in Appendix C.
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its air of calm, serious, dispassionate scholarship, its obvious thor-
oughness, and its scientific precision might discourage later schol-
ars from pursuing these important questions. I also became wor-
ried that Currie had slighted-even overlooked!-the legitimate
claims of others to the honors he bestowed on Gabriel Duval[l].
Could it be that Currie's efforts were simply pseudo-science em-
ployed in the pursuit of some predetermined plan to award
Duval[l] the coveted prize without serious consideration of candi-
dates so shrouded in obscurity that they escaped proper attention
even in a contest of insignificance? Could it be that Currie's use of
objective indicators, such as PPY, IPP, and EHH?, was intended
to divert attention from the restricted scope of the study and the
proper limits on the reliability of the conclusions? Could it even be
that Professor Currie's work is simply a subtle method of defend-
ing the propertied classes from scrutiny by an enlightened intelli-
gentsia? To find insignificance embedded in our early post-revolu-
tionary history may dull the revolutionary appetite, and to read
articles like Currie's may divert time from preparation for the next
revolution.6
I therefore attempted to incite my colleagues to carry Profes-
sor Currie's preliminary study to fruition. Alas, few of them
wanted to learn the complete truth about Gabriel Duval[l] and his
rivals. My curiosity could not be slaked without learning more,
however, and if no one else would do the work, I would have to do
it. Besides, I comforted myself, this would be at least as enlighten-
ing as spending an equal amount of time playing video games.' So
I set off to find more evidence.
The first step was to determine the universe of cases within
which to judge insignificance. Professor Currie chose early consti-
tutional law, which was not only fitting, because it is his specialty,
6 Pseudo-science in defense of class interests is of course rampant in legal work. For
proof of this see Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 675
(1983) ("The social sciences they perverted into the source of argumentative ploys with
which to give arbitrary though stylized policy discussions the blessing of a specious author-
ity."). It's a shame that Unger does not offer us any examples of the work "they" have
"perverted"; we probably could learn a lot from "them." It is safe to say, however, that
Unger did not have Currie as a target, if only because he had not seen Currie's work.
Compare R. DUBREN, THE VIDEO MASTER'S GUIDE TO CENTIPEDE (1982) (video
games) and E. ZAVISCA & G. BELTOWSKI, BE A HOME VIDEO GAME SUPERSTAR: SECRETS TO
THE BEST GAMES FOR YOUR ATARI VCS (1983) (same) with J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1971) (early Supreme Court) and G. HASKINS & H.
JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1981) (same). Cf. Atari,
Inc., MISSILE COMMAND (1980) (not available on LEXIS); Herzel & Schmidt, SEC Is
Probing "Double Pac-man" Takeover Defense, Legal Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 25, col. 1
(double PAC-MAN defense to tender offers).
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but also simple for him, because he has recently surveyed all of the
constitutional cases of the Court's first century.' I agree with the
"early" part of the choice: Justices who sat after the Civil War
have been handicapped in the quest for True Insignificance by law
clerks, secretarial staff, typewriters, and the fact that the problems
they faced are more likely to be important, or worse, remembered,
today (and hence the Justices more likely to be Significant).
I am less inclined, though, to go along with the limitation to
constitutional law. It was a small part of the early docket, a part
especially likely to appeal to Chief Justices and therefore likely to
show the Associate Justices at their best (that is, at their most si-
lent) in this contest. The Associate Justices were more likely to
mar their records by writing in some other area. My first response
was to add securities and antitrust law to Currie's list and see how
the Justices rated with a broader set of cases. It soon became clear,
however, that the set of all constitutional, antitrust, and securities
law cases and the set of all constitutional cases before 1865 are the
same. To conduct any inclusive survey, then, I would have to add
diversity, admiralty, and general federal question cases, and so I
did. I have examined (or at least counted) every opinion written in
every field through December Term 1863, Chief Justice Taney's
last, in a relentless search for the trivial, the transient, the taci-
turn, and the tergiversating.
Any survey of insignificance of course raises the question of
comparability with earlier surveys. Professor Currie is not the first
to inquire into the accomplishments of our least distinguished Jus-
tices, and a Justice could not truly be said to be insignificant if he
has achieved recognition elsewhere. Indeed, a Justice recognized
twenty years ago as the "most insignificant" probably no longer
could lay claim to that title: he would be the possessor of a title
("Most Insignificant Justice") that would set him apart from other
Justices who had done equally little but escaped such notice. The
award of the much-coveted, prestigious Most Insignificant Justice
title disqualifies the incumbent from repeating in a later survey.9
8 The first three of these articles, even more seminal than his piece on insignificance,
have appeared in this Review. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801,
48 U. CHL L. REV. 819 (1981);.Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers
of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Cm. L. Ray. 646 (1982); Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CH. L. REv. 887
(1982). More to come.
9Dean Gerhard Casper dissents from this analysis. He believes that the (in)significance
of Justices is fixed by what the Justices themselves do, and that recognition of their
(non)accomplishments cannot alter their relative position. The rest of my colleagues have
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The most interesting of these surveys is one from 1970, which
classified the Justices into five categories: Great, Near Great, Aver-
age, Below Average, and Failure.10 The survey is far from satisfac-
tory. The respondents were not told what the ratings mean, and
the curious segmentation of the results-most nineteenth-century
Justices are lumped into Average, while twentieth-century Justices
are pushed to the extremes-suggests that the respondents had not
heard of many of the Justices and gave us their opinions on Cur-
rie's BVD (Benightedness of View) scale rather than on more ap-
propriate measures of excellence.
Still, the survey is not useless. We may disqualify at once the
eight who were rated as failures. These worthies are not insignifi-
cant. After all, the respondents in the survey had heard of them
and knew enough to object to them. We also may disqualify those
rated below average. Again, at least twenty percent of the respon-
dents had heard of them, so they flunk the EHH? test. Moreover,
the below average category appears to be filled with Justices who
met premature deaths or resigned shortly after being named;
whatever else is true of these short-lived Justices, they have no
better claim to true insignificance than the seven people who were
nominated, were confirmed by the Senate, and refused to serve.11
Indeed they have less: the six below average Justices at least did
something, whereas scores of years passed without the seven refus-
ers contributing a single significant opinion. We must, then, find
the Most Insignificant Justice among those rated average, signify-
ing that the respondents had no opinions about them one way or
the other. Justices Clifford, Duval[l], Livingston, McKinley, and
Todd, among Currie's other candidates, can be found there.
not objected to the analysis in the text and therefore agree with me. Qui tacet consentire
videtur. BRooM, A SELEMCON OF LEGAL MAXIMS 85 (10th ed. 1939). (A translation of the
maxim is on file with The University of Chicago Law Review.)
'0 See infra Appendix E.
"7 John Jay, Chief Justice from 1790-1794, was confirmed as Chief Justice again in 1800
but refused to rejoin the Court. The others refused Associate Justiceships: Robert Hanson
Harrison in 1789; Levi Lincoln in 1811; John Quincy Adams in 1811; William Smith in 1837;
Edwin M. Stanton in 1869 (Stanton's refusal took an extreme, but perhaps necessary,
form-he died four days after the confirmation); Roscoe Conkling in 1882.
One might add to the list Associate Justice William Cushing, who was nominated and
confirmed as Chief Justice in 1796 but refused to assume that post, pleading old age. That
did not prevent him, however, from spending another 14 unproductive years on the Court as
Associate Justice. His single fortunate act of declining the post disqualifies him from being
Most Insignificant: had Cushing taken the job, John Marshall never would have become
Chief Justice, and we would be living in a much changed nation. Cushing also had an OPO,
see infra Appendix A, three times that of Duval[l] and Todd, and he wrote a number of
significant opinions before John Marshall became Chief Justice.
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Perhaps, though, this assumes that only Justices who are in-
significant for a long time are entitled to the honor. Some men
achieve insignificance; others have insignificance thrust upon
them."' On what grounds are we to reject the claims of those who
were appointed at age fifty-five, were expected to serve twenty
years, and were silent for most of that period because of premature
resignations or death? Are we to disfavor these contestants, to
deny them the prize merely because others, equally inept, lingered
on and cast a few votes in their declining years? (I am willing to
assume, but only for the sake of argument, that such Justices as
Gabriel Duval[l] had better years from which to decline.)
In other words, why are we to assess insignificance ex post
rather than ex ante? Why not assume that a Justice who left the
bench prematurely would have continued to produce at the same
lethargic pace for his expected life span? A broad, representative
spectrum of legal and economic commentators, discussing a large
number of questions, have proven beyond question that ex ante
analysis is the appropriate way to look at legal matters.1 3 That this
view has been so widely accepted supports its application here as
well. A short but incredibly productive spurt of utter silence might
be more insignificant, especially in promising years of the same,
than a long career full of whispering. On an ex ante approach we
might award the honors to Alfred Moore by acclamation. Justice
Moore, who delivered one brief opinion14 during his four placid
12 This is a Famous Quotation and therefore should be attributed to this article as fol-
lows: Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
481, 485 & n.12 (1983).
13 E.g., Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
302-04 (1983) (criminal procedure); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Eviden-
tiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 323-30, 345-49
(insider trading, secret agents, evidentiary privileges, and the production of information);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 703-14 (1982)
(corporate control transactions); Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Anti-
trust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 331, 342-44 (1980)
(antitrust).
14 The Eliza, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 39 (1800). Some might say that the elegance of the
opinion disqualifies Moore. The case involved a claim for salvage of a U.S. vessel captured
in March 1799 by a French privateer and retaken in April by the claimant. A statute per-
mitted a salvage award of one-half of the value of the vessel if it had been in the hands of an
"enemy," and the question was whether the French privateer was an "enemy." Moore wrote:
It is, however, more particularly urged, that the word "enemy" cannot be applied to
the French; because the section in which it is used, is confined to such a state of war, as
would authorize a recapture of property belonging to a nation in amity with the United
States, and such a state of war, it is said, does not exist between America and France.
A number of books have been cited to furnish a glossary on the word enemy; yet, our
situation is so extraordinary, that I doubt whether a parallel case can be traced in the
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terms, showed every promise of setting a standard of passive irrele-
vance for centuries to come; only his resignation prevented him
from fulfilling his pledge.' 5
Nonetheless, the ex ante approach to assessing insignificance
seems fraught with danger. A Justice who starts out his career in
quiet observation, and so might achieve true insignificance if his
health permits a long tenure, also might have a stroke, change of
heart, or even a political conversion and begin spewing forth bilge,
thus turning himself from an historical footnote to a rollicking ca-
lamity. To make matters worse, a Justice who resigns or dies
before his time has by that very step done something out of the
ordinary-in other words, he has committed a Significant Act by
upsetting political expectations. He wrecks the plan crafted by the
President who appointed him, and he mobilizes the President and
the Senate at a moment's notice. We are in the big leagues16 of
insignificance here. So many Justices have a plausible claim to be
the Sultan of Sloth, the Titan of Torpor, that a single significant
act in a judicial career is disqualifying. Thus the early-departers
are out of the running. 17
This approach also disqualifies Justice Clifford, one of Profes-
sor Currie's favorites. Clifford attracted attention, lots of it, by his
preposterous irrelevancies and obstreperous posturing. He was cer-
tainly not invisible, and invisibility is the hallmark of True Insig-
history of nations. But if words are the representatives of ideas, let me ask, by what
other word, the idea of the relative situation of America and France could be communi-
cated, than by that of hostility or war? And how can the characters of the parties
engaged in hostility or war, be otherwise described, than by the denomination of ene-
mies? It is for the honor and dignity of both nations, therefore, that they should be
called enemies; for it is by that description alone, that either could justify or excuse the
scene of bloodshed, depredation and confiscation, which has unhappily occurred ....
Id. at 39. Lest these unfortunately well-turned sentences disqualify Moore, I ask: who is
more insignificant, a Justice who writes well but maintains a selfish and withdrawn silence,
or a Justice who writes poorly but, with the public interest at heart, allows his colleagues to
carry the burden of expression?
18 Two other Justices delivered but one opinion each (see infra Appendix A): Chief
Justice Rutledge, whose brief seriatim opinion in Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 133, 169
(1795), is so trivial that it is sometimes said that he wrote nothing at all, and Thomas John-
son, who got off an opinion of less than half a page in 1792, Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 402, 405 (1792), before deciding to take things easy by resigning.
These are both impressive achievements, but they do not rival Moore's. His OPY (opin-
ions per year) of 0.25 is considerably lower than that of Rutledge (1.00) or Johnson (0.50),
see infra Appendix A, and we must assume in an ex ante analysis that Moore would have
maintained this lead had he remained on the Court.
6 Whether of baseball, as Professor Currie suggests, or of tag-team wrestling, as a less
kind observer might think, I leave to the reader.
17 So the sport might turn out to be track rather than baseball or wrestling.
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nificance. To have a reasonable claim to the title, one high on the
Inanities Per Page (IPP) scale must be low on the Pages Per Year
(PPY) scale, or some other measure of frequency of output. IPP is
useful only as a tie-breaker among Justices with similarly meager
levels of expression. With Clifford falls Henry Baldwin, a long-sur-
viving Justice who alternated between periods of sullen quietude,
sometimes delivering oral opinions but refusing to allow the Re-
porters to publish them, and bilious but absurd writings.18 Bald-
win's work is of no conceivable significance, and he had no effect
on his colleagues or on the course of decisions,"9 but the Justice
was sufficiently colorful that he cannot be taken seriously in this
contest.
Enough has been said to produce a narrow field. Justices
whom Professor Currie found to be significant even though short
of words have committed disqualifying acts. On the other hand,
the Justices who sat silently through term after term of constitu-
tional decision making-Cushing, Duval[l], Livingston, McKinley,
and Todd-are still in the running. I exclude Cushing because he
committed a single significant act in his life.20 Some other way
" In the 1832 Term Baldwin dissented four times but refused to surrender the texts to
the Reporter. E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595-96 (1832). In 1839 he
clung unyieldingly to a concurrence. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 597
(1839). In 1838 he joined both a majority opinion affirming a judgment on the merits and a
dissenting opinion pointing out that the Court lacked jurisdiction and had erred on the
merits to the extent they were before it. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102,
139 (1838). In some terms he was silent (for example, 1833, 1834, 1841), but in others he
wrote as many as nine opinions for the Court (1836) or dissented as frequently as 12 times
(1838), usually, and mercifully, without opinion.
" Perhaps this understates Baldwin's contribution to our jurisprudence. He was a
trend-setter in the tone of his work, helping the Court along in the transition from comrade-
ship to combat, from valor to vitriol, as a way of doing business. Compare Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101, 107 (1807) (W. Johnson, J., dissenting) ("In this case I have
the misfortune to dissent from the majority of my brethren.. . . I feel myself much relieved
from the painful sensation resulting from the necessity of dissenting from the majority of
the court, in being supported by the opinon of one of my brethren, . . .") with FERC v.
Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2149 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("the Court's 'choice' is
an absurdity") and id. at 2139 n.27, 2141 n.30 (opinion of the Court) (the dissent's argu-
ments "are little more than exercises in the art of ipse dixit" and "are substituted for useful
constitutional analysis"). On the current role of majority opinions, see Dobbert v. Flordia,
432 U.S. 282, 311 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I assume that [the majority opinion in]
this case will ultimately be regarded as nothing more than an archaic gargoyle. It is none-
theless distressing to witness such a demeaning construction of a majestic bulwark in the
framework of our Constitution."). On the current role of dissenting opinions, see United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10 (1980) ("The comments in
the dissenting opinion about the proper cases for which to look for the correct statement of
the equal protection rational-basis standard, and about which cases limit earlier cases, are
just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.").
20 See supra note 11.
1983]
The University of Chicago Law Review
must be found to decide among the rest. One possible indicator is
the treatment of these candidates by scholars of the Court.
Professor Currie refers us to Beveridge's biography of Mar-
shall 21 for evidence about Duval[l]. Why stop there? Baker's later,
and therefore better, biography of Marshall also furnishes evi-
dence. 22 Baker refers to Cushing eleven times, to Duval[l] fifteen
times, to Livingston eight times, and to Todd only five times (two
of which simply point out that Todd was absent from the bench
for the Dartmouth College case, the occasion of Duval[l]'s imperti-
nent dissent). (McKinley did not serve with Marshall.) Several of
the references to Cushing and Livingston are complimentary, but
Baker says of Todd only that he did not "appear 'to want tal-
ents,'-23 doubtless meaning that he had talents and was trying,
successfully, to get rid of them. Todd was a "'dark complexioned,
good-looking, substantial man.' Little else could be said about him
regarding his years on the bench."'2 4 Duval[l], on the other hand,
"became distinguished for holding on to his seat for many years
after he had become aged and infirm because he was fearful of who
would replace him, thus inaugurating what has become a popular
tradition for subsequent Supreme Court Justices. 2 5 Aha! Some-
thing "distinguished"! Is this the one Significant Act that disquali-
fies Duval[l]? 26
Or take the work of another observer of the early Court,
Henry Abraham, who had the following to say about Duval[l]:
Duval [sic] . . . proved to be a competent if unexciting jurist,
fulfilling Madison's expectations on grounds of both political
compatibility and legal acumen. He had served with distinc-
tion on his state's highest court for six years .... Looking
21 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919), cited in Currie, supra note 2, at
468.
22 L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW (1974).
11 Id. at 538 (quoting letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 25, 1808),
reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 168 (W. Story ed. Boston 1851)).
2, Id. at 674 (quoting description of the Court by a New York newspaper
correspondent).
25 Id. at 539.
26 See also the Haskins & Johnson treatment of Marshall's first 15 years, G. HASKINS &
H. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 681-87, which refers 20 times to Livingston, 18 times to Cush-
ing, 6 times to Todd, and only 3 times to Duval[l]. The authors view Livingston and Cush-
ing as substantial figures. See, e.g., id. at 391. One reference to Duval[l] says that he left a
"modest" mark. Id. at 392. Five of the six references to Todd report his absence or presence
on some important date but say no more; the sixth calls his contribution "minimal," id. at
391, and points out that, in light of the hopes President Jefferson had for his appointee,
"the lack of strongly voiced dissent [to Marshall's Federalist views] must have surprised his
contemporaries as much as it perplexes historians and biographers," id.
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every inch the legendary jurist, he spent almost twenty-five
workmanlike, quiet years on the bench.
This is either an unwarranted libel of President Madison, who ap-
pointed Duval[l], or a conclusion that Duval[l] is not qualified for
the post of Most Insignificant Justice. Abraham finds Brockholst
Livingston (of the "tomblike silence"28) "to be an able, thoughtful,
delightfully humorous, and learned member of the Court during
his seventeen years there. '29 Abraham does not grace us with any
of Livingston's better jokes, but the spirit is obvious. McKinley is
portrayed as "colorless," 30 an apparent assertion that albinism and
its complications were responsible for his frequent absence from
the bench, and Todd is said to have "established but a modestly
distinguished record on the Court."'" Clifford, according to Abra-
ham, was "an able lawyer and legal scholar who had been a distin-
guished representative in both the Maine and United States lower
houses. . . . Clifford served on the Court competently and dili-
gently but without particular distinction. 3 2
Perhaps all this just shows that before beginning work on his
book Abraham had acquired a word processor with a free supply of
encomiums and had set out to minimize his costs of writing.33
Nonetheless, his views should give us pause. What are we to make
of these two divergent stories: Abraham's, in which no Justice is
below average, or Currie's, in which at least seventy percent of the
Justices are below average and a good fifty percent are in the bot-
tom quintile?
We could look at the treatment of these contenders by their
contemporaries, but that provides scant evidence. They were all
such wallflowers that they escaped much contemporary notice.
True, Jefferson did say of his appointees (William Johnson, Liv-
ingston, and Todd) that they served among "a subtle corps of sap-
pers and miners" consisting of a "crafty chief judge" and "lazy or
timid associates."'14 This might be thought to disqualify Livingston
17 H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 82 (1974).
2 Currie, supra note 2, at 470.
" H. ABRAHAM, supra note 27, at 77.
3o Id. at 102.
3I Id. at 78.
32 Id. at 105.
" It appears that he used some discretion, however. In describing McKinley, for exam-
ple, he called him only "colorless," supra text accompanying note 30, refraining from the
remainder of the litany, odorless and tasteless.
3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), reprinted in 15
WRITINGS O THOMAS JEFFERSON 297-98 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1905). Does this make
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and Todd; to be called "subtle" by a man as subtle as Thomas
Jefferson is damnation in this contest. But reflection discloses that
Jefferson called the Court "subtle," and John Marshall dominated
the Court; Johnson, Livingston, and Todd were merely "lazy or
timid" and so still in the running. Anyway, Jefferson was obviously
writing in anger, with little concern for the facts. In addition to
Marshall, the Court then comprised Bushrod Washington, William
Johnson, and Joseph Story, none of whom was lazy, timid, or dolt-
ish. Jefferson's darts must have been directed to Livingston, Todd,
and Duval[l]. Relative to the expectations of the Republican Presi-
dents for these men to recapture the Court from the Federalists
Marshall and Washington, they are among history's biggest
disappointments.
If Jefferson's peevish remarks do not steer us to the Most In-
significant, what of the Court's treatment of its own? Then, as
now, the death or retirement of a Justice was noticed in the pages
of the United States Reports. Thomas Todd is the recipient of a
particularly telling eulogy. The customary warm and gracious trib-
ute to his service appeared in the United States Reports after his
death-fourteen years after his death!35 What to make of the de-
lay? Did no one notice his absence?"6 Or did it just take fourteen
years to find someone willing (or able) to say anything warm and
gracious in public about Justice Todd? That the remarks are at-
tributed to an anonymous "judicial friend" suggests something of
this sort. (I put to one side the possibility that Todd continued to
sit in the fourteen years after his death, albeit with the same effect
on our jurisprudence as his work in the seventeen years before his
death, and then wrote his own eulogy. This would be a Significant
Act, but some things are too fantastic to take seriously.37 )
Father Jefferson, and not Brother Currie, the source of the epigram, "John Marshall and the
Six Dwarfs"? Contra Currie, supra note 2, at 469 & n.23. But see W. DISNEY, SNOW WHrrE
AND THE SEVEN DwARs (1938) (Dwarfs named Dopey, Bashful, Sneezy, Grumpy, Sleepy,
Happy, and Doc).
3 See 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) iii (1839).
36 This is plausible. Todd was absent for the entire 1808, 1819, and 1825 Terms and
most of the 1809, 1813, and 1815 Terms. His death merely continued this pattern of
absence.
37 On the other hand, Justice Trimble had an opinion published posthumously, Hol-
lingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466, 470-79 (1830), and Justice Brandeis had a
whole volume of opinions published posthumously, A. Bicm, THE UNPuBLmSHED OPINIONS
OF MR. JusTIcE BRANDEIS (1957). (Query: How could the opinions be "unpublished" when
they appeared in the very volume bearing that title?) In recent years two circuit judges have
cast deciding votes from the grave. Hillsdale College v. Department of HEW, 696 F.2d 418
(6th Cir. 1982) (2-1 decision, with Lester Cecil "voting" with the "majority" 20 days after
his death); Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (2-1
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The evidence from contemporary reports is too spotty to be
the basis of an informed judgment. Thus I was compelled to do
what professors of law dread: turn to the facts. I surveyed the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court through the end of Chief Justice Ta-
ney's service, collecting the data necessary to make a definitive
judgment about significance. How many opinions did each Justice
write? How long were they? How many dissents did each write,
and how many other dissents were noted by the Reporters or by
other Justices? How many opportunities did each Justice have to
express opinions? In early years the Court heard fewer than ten
cases per Term, but in later years it heard more than eighty. Insig-
nificance is relative, and an output sufficient to hold one's own in
1800 might be deemed trifling for a Justice sitting in 1850.
These data are collected in Appendix A. They show, as one
might expect, that as the years went by the Justices became more
vocal (more opinions), more wordy (longer opinions), and more
contentious (more dissents). The data also offer insights into the
insignificance of the contenders. Gabriel Duval[l], far from uttering
simply "DuvALL, Justice, dissented," 8 wrote eighteen opinions,
fifteen of these for the Court. Thomas Todd, although silent in
constitutional matters, wrote fourteen opinions, twelve for the
Court. Brockholst Livingston was even more active, producing
forty-nine opinions, including seven dissents; several of these forty-
nine concerned important issues of the day. His activities on the
Court, together with Currie's admission that Livingston wrote sig-
nificant opinions on circuit, 9 disqualify him from further consider-
ation. And even John McKinley, fabled for his absence from the
bench,40 was a producer (of sorts) when he showed up for work. He
wrote twenty-two opinions during the eleven Terms he attended,
and as Appendix D shows, a number (a small number) of these
decision, with Harold Leventhal "voting" with the "majority" and filing a concurring opin-
ion 37 days after his death), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
" Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 713 (1819) (4th
ed. 1883). See also Currie, supra note 2, at 470 & n.33 (noting different versions in different
editions).
" Currie, supra note 2, at 470.
40 McKinley missed the 1840, 1843, and 1848 Terms because of illness, and he failed to
attend many arguments when he was in Washington. His absences became sufficiently noto-
rious that when McKinley was absent from the January 1850 Term, Howard duly noted
McKinley's illness, only to retract sheepishly in the next volume. Compare 49 U.S. (8 How.)
iii n.* (1850) with 50 U.S. (9 How.) iii (1851) ("ERRATUM. The note in the eighth volume,
stating that 'Mr. Justice McKinley was prevented, by indisposition, from attending the
Court during the January term, 1850,' is incorrect; as Mr. McKinley was engaged during
that period in holding an important session of the U.S. Circuit Court at New Orleans.").
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opinions were in significant cases.,1
The most useful measure of significance (other than a detailed
examination of every opinion) is OPO, or opinions per opportunity.
This index compensates for the fact that the earlier Justices had
fewer opportunities to express themselves simply because the
Court heard fewer cases. The OPO of most members of the early
Court was quite high, with Jay achieving an OPO of 0.38 (three
opinions in eight cases), and even the maligned Thomas Johnson,
who wrote but seventeen lines in his career, had an OPO of 0.17
(one opinion in six cases). John Marshall, who dominated the
Court for more than thirty years, achieved the highest sustained
OPO of 0.30.
If we disregard Alfred Moore, a four-Term flash-in-the-pan of
nonproductivity, we find that the OPO index suggests two serious
contenders for the title Most Insignificant Justice: Thomas Todd
and Gabriel Duval[l]. Todd has an OPO of 0.022, or approximately
one opinion for every forty-six opportunities (14 of 647, to be ex-
act). Duval[l] has an even better OPO of 0.019 (18 opinions in 962
opportunities, or 1 per 53). It is almost a dead heat. On the basis of
PPY (pages per year) things look much the same. Todd is slightly
ahead with 2.66 PPY, compared with Duval[l]'s 2.76 PPY. The
rate of dissent also is remarkably similar, with Todd registering
0.18 dissents per Term, Duval[l] 0.17 per Term. These numbers
are hard to put in perspective, so consider this: Duval[l], Todd,
Jay, Rutledge, Moore, Blair, Thomas Johnson, and Wilson, com-
bined, wrote less in their entire careers than Justice Byrnes wrote
in his single term.,2
These fine figures are the product of hard work. Todd, who
reached the Court five years ahead of his archrival Duval[l], acted
quickly to make the most of the lead, doing nothing whatsoever
the first two years. He wrote less than a page in the first six.
Duval[l], on the other hand, was conscious of the need to preserve
41 McKinley's dissenting opinion in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839), supporting a position he had taken on circuit, is probably enough by itself to dis-
qualify him from further consideration. So, too, is his opinion in The Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283, 452 (1849), which was necessary to allow the Court to achieve a majority.
Although it is true that McKinley "made no significant contribution to legal thinking in any
form" and that "[w]hen he died in 1852 he had not made any notable imprint on the work
of his profession," C. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67
(1974), one can lose the laurels of the Most Insignificant Justice by the lesser act of writing
in a significant case.
41 Byrnes, who sat only for the 1941 Term, wrote 16 opinions with a total of 142.8
pages. At least one of Byrnes's opinions is Significant: Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
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his insignificance: he lasted nine Terms after Todd's death, and
the final five of these produced no written words. Had Duval[l] left
behind anything at all from those years, Todd would have walked
away with the prize for insignificance. It is only Duval[l]'s prema-
ture resignation that prevented him from becoming, through en-
durance, a clear victor. Duval[l] retired (formally, anyway) in 1835
at the age of eighty-two; he lived to be ninety-one. Just think of
the years of silence of which his selfish act deprived us!
Now there is always the possibility that the activities of these
two Justices on circuit would enable us to overcome the inclination
to treat them as the Tweedledee and Tweedledum of sloth. Alas,
no help from that quarter. Duval[l] was as scrupulously silent on
circuit as on the Supreme Court, and Todd left behind little but
hints. His biographer tells us: "Unfortunately, most of his circuit
opinions have disappeared. '43 Disappeared? Were they written in
disappearing ink? Perhaps they were lost because no one wanted
to preserve them or because they were unwritten as of the time of
Todd's death.4 4 At all events, by what lights may we call their dis-
appearance "unfortunate"?
There seemed nothing left but to evaluate the work directly.
This was not an arduous task; they left little to evaluate. At the
same time, reading the collected works of Thomas Todd and
Gabriel Duval[l] (Appendices B and C) was no picnic. These mas-
ters of insignificance did not leave behind a pile of small, but well-
polished, gems. The opinions are graceless and plodding, saved
only by their brevity.
The life work of Justice Todd may be summed up in two
words: land tenure. Ten of his fourteen opinions (App. B, Nos. 4-
13) involved land tenure disputes. He told us that a deed will not
support a writ of entry unless the description of the lands is spe-
cific (Nos. 10, 13), that a patent issued by mistake will not support
a writ of entry (No. 12), and on and on and on. He apparently
acquired this interest while serving on the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky. 5 Having built up all this human capital, he saw no reason
to abandon it, or acquire new knowledge, just because he had
changed courts. He apparently took literally the charge that, as a
Justice, he construe the Law of the Land.
4" Israel, Thomas Todd, in 1 THE JusTrcas OF TE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1789-1969, at 410 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969). For the rest of the available
information on Todd, see the eulogy mentioned supra note 35 and accompanying text.
" But see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
45 Israel, supra note 43, at 409.
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Todd's remaining four opinions show only disdain for other
subjects. He tossed off a laconic and murky dissent in an action on
a bond (No. 1) and a laconic and murky concurrence on a jurisdic-
tional point (No. 3). The Reporter attributed to him four unrea-
soned lines, designated as an "opinion for the Court" but probably
just an oral remark, in M'Kim v. Voorhies (No. 2), a case holding
that state courts may not enjoin the judgments of federal courts. 6
If Marshall indeed assigned Todd the opinion in this case, he
presented Todd with a magnificent opportunity to disqualify him-
self from any contest of insignificance; the kindest thing to be said
is that Todd dropped the ball.' 7 Finally, there is Todd's last opin-
ion (No. 14), which is a careful, if dull, statement of the "best evi-
dence rule" and a delineation of the adverse inference that may be
drawn if one in possession of evidence fails to produce it. The
opinion is competent but no more.
Gabriel Duval[l] had broader interests. He wrote on commer-
cial law (App. C, Nos. 1, 15), the rights of the United States to
recover debts (Nos. 4, 5, 7, 13), admiralty (Nos. 6, 10, 12), jurisdic-
tion (Nos. 2, 17), land law (Nos. 8, 11, 14), and statutory construc-
tion (Nos. 9, 10, 16). True, some of these opinions are unusual (for
example, M'Iver's Lessee v. Walker (No. 8), in which the full opin-
ion reads: "My opinion is that there is no safe rule but to follow
the needle[, making full allowance for variation, according to prac-
tical observation]." 48), but they are in the main workmanlike.4 9
They display a range of interests and even a competence that
Todd carefully concealed.
Although only M'Kim among all of Todd's cases was poten-
tially significant-and then because of the opinion's subject rather
than its execution-at least three of Duval[l]'s opinions must be
taken seriously. One is The Frances & Eliza (No. 12), holding that
a statute did not require the forfeiture of a ship, bound from a
British port, that landed in the United States, even though the
landing apparently violated an embargo on British ships and
4' Related problems continue to be litigated. E.g., General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436
U.S. 493 (1978); General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977).
47 Compare supra text accompanying note 16 with supra text accompanying note 17.
46 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 173, 179 (1815) (App. C, No. 8). The bracketed portion was added
in later editions. Was Justice Duvalfl's literary executor again afoot?
49 They have their share of incomplete sentences and quirks, too. See, e.g., The Nep-
tune, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 601, 607 (1818) (No. 10) ('That it [the vessel's register] was alleged
to have been granted to the former owner by the collector for the port of Wilmington in
North Carolina, and that it was lost."). But these cases are very old, and if whole opinions
by Thomas Todd have disappeared it should not surprise us that the subjects and verbs in
some sentences by Gabriel Duval[l] have vanished as well.
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goods. The Court found the landing innocent because the ship
used the prohibited port only for emergency provisioning. Yet five
years earlier the Court, with Marshall, Washington, and Johnson
in dissent, had held that a ship laden with rum from British Ja-
maica was forfeit for putting into New York, even though it was
undisputed that the ship was driven in by a storm, with its keel
broken and its rudder carried awayY° In five short years Duval[l]
accomplished what Marshall had been unable to do: he persuaded
the Court to interpret the forfeiture statutes in light of their pur-
pose rather than their letter.5 1 Duval[l]'s opinion was unanimous.
This is not, however, the ground on which Duval[l] ultimately
forfeited the Mantle of the Most Insignificant. Duval[l] lost,
rather, by writing in two slavery cases. There was then no surer
way to attract attention. In Mima Queen & Child v. Hepburn (No.
3) Duval[1] filed a solitary dissent from a Marshall opinion. The
plaintiff in the case sought a declaration of her freedom. She ad-
duced hearsay evidence that her mother was free at the time of her
birth. Marshall held that the evidence was properly excluded as
hearsay and the plaintiff declared to be a slave. Duval[l] dissented,
pointing out that because the mother was dead it was hearsay or
nothing, and that because freedom was at stake the Court should
not follow the customary rules of evidence. Here, it seems, Mar-
shall and Story rate uncomfortably high on Currie's BVD scale,
while Duval[l] acquitted himself well.
Then there is Duval[l]'s last opinion, in LeGrand v. Darnall
(No. 18), holding (for a unanimous Court!) that a master's testa-
mentary grant of real or personal property to a slave worked a
manumission. Because only a free person could hold real property,
the grant effected the freedom by necessary implication. Duval[l]'s
presumption of freedom, unable to carry the day in Mima Queen,
prevailed sixteen years later in LeGrand.
One more inquiry completes the story. Have any of Todd's or
Duval[l]'s opinions attracted the attention of other judges? Any
substantial degree of attention-or, worse, praise-might disqual-
ify a candidate for this coveted award. I therefore did a citation
check of each of the finalists' opinions. As one might expect, Mima
Queen and LeGrand are much-cited cases, with citations to Mima
50 The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 59 (1818), written by Brockholst Livingston for
himself, Todd, Duval[l], and Story.
51 The cases are not technically in conflict. Duval[1]'s opinion interpreted a different
statute, and the facts were interestingly different too. But the approach to statutory con-
struction is what really divides the cases.
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Queen continuing to appear today.52 Several of Duval[l]'s other
cases also still are cited: in the last five years Prince v. Bartlett
and Walton v. United States (Nos. 7, 13) have been cited in state
courts.53 On the other hand, no Todd opinion has been cited in any
court since 1965, and the opinions that enjoyed any currency at all,
such as Preston v. Bowder and Robinson v. Campbell (Nos. 5, 8)
did so only for a brief time, and then only in state courts wrestling
with the same land tenure matters Todd had addressed in his di-
versity cases. Todd's opinions in Finley v. Lynn and Perkins v.
Ramsey (Nos. 1, 10) have never been cited by any court.
Enough, enough. Of the finalists, Todd and Duval[l], one dis-
qualified himself by writing some significant opinions. True,
Duval[l] tried to atone for this by remaining mute (he was deaf by
then as well) after his opinion in LeGrand, but it was too late. His
Significant Acts had disqualified him. The winner by default-in
what other way can one win this kind of contest?-is Thomas
Todd. Long may he reign.
E.g., United States v. Pomponio, 563 F.2d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, -435
U.S. 942 (1978).
" E.g., United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 493 Pa. 441, 464, 426 A.2d 1098, 1110
(1981) (opinion in support of reversal) (citing Pince); State v. Selig, 635 P.2d 786, 789
(Wyo. 1981) (citing Walton). I am prepared to determine the half-life of the opinions of
Todd and Duval[l], if that becomes necessary to yield a final judgment. See Landes & Pos-
ner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & EcON. 249. (1976).
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These data are derived from an exhaustive survey of the United States Reports
through December Term 1863, Chief Justice Taney's last Term. I read all volumes through
February Term, 1825 (23 U.S., 10 Wheat.) myself. My research assistants, Patrick Longan
and Edward Wahl, completed the survey. The data presented here are largely consistent
with the tabulations in A. BLAUsTmN & R. MRSKY, THE FmsT ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 127-
49 (1978), and supplement that work by adding page counts. Differences in the opinion
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counts may be attributable to the choices described in the following notes.
NOTES: 1. The Justices are listed in order of appointment, with Rutledge, who was an
Associate Justice during years the Court did not sit, counted only for his recess appointment
as Chief Justice.
2. "Terms" denotes the number of annual sessions of the Court held while the Justice
was eligible to sit. An asterisk before the number of Terms indicates that the Justice contin-
ued to sit with Chief Justice Chase (Taney's replacement). The additional Terms of these
Justices are omitted from this survey. Some years, e.g., 1795, had more than one session but
are counted as one Term. In 1850 the commencement of the Court's annual session was
changed from January to December; I treat the December 1850 sitting as a Term separate
from the January 1850 sitting. The use of the "Term" as a measure of length of service is
more accurate than "years served" because Justices sometimes took their seats just after a
sitting had ended, or died just before a sitting commenced. There were, moreover, no sit-
tings in 1789, 1790, 1802, and 1811, and the 1791 sitting (which I do not count as a Term)
entailed only three inconsequential docket-control acts. The omission of sittings, coupled
with the time of appointment of each Justice, could cause "years of service" to overstate by
several years the number of times the Justice could have met with the Court. "Terms" in-
cludes, however, meetings a Justice missed because of illness, "indisposition," or circuit rid-
ing. A judge may achieve insignificance by absence no less than by invisibility while in:
attendance.
3. "NOP" indicates the number of opinions the Justice wrote in his career. It includes
all majority, seriatim, concurring, and dissenting opinions of any description. Even two-word
opinions (e.g., "I dissent") are included. NOP does not include dissents that are noted by
the Reporter (e.g., "Mr. Justice Baldwin dissented") or by a colleague (e.g., "I am comforted
that Mr. Justice Todd joins me in these views."). A double asterisk in subsequent Appendi-
ces indicates such statements not qualifying as opinions. These are included, however, in
column 9 (dissenting votes). The number of nondissenting opinions may be extracted by
subtracting column 8 (dissenting opinions) from NOP. NOP also does not include short
opinions, of a page or less, by the Chief Justice or (in the absence or disqualification of the
Chief Justice) the senior Associate Justice announcing the judgment of the Court. These are
treated as identical in principle to opinions headed "By the Court" or to dispositions sum-
marized by the Reporter but not attributed to any Justice. The treatment is necessary be-
cause the practices of the early Reporters did'not distinguish between short announcements
by the presiding Justice and other ways of disposing of a case, and the Reporters do not
seem to have had any consistent rule for choosing how to style such short dispositions. Al-
though this treatment significantly reduces the number of opinions attributed to Chief Jus-
tices Marshall and Taney and cuts by a few the number attributed to Justices Washington
(1812 Term) and Story (1836 Term), it does not otherwise affect the results.
4. "OPY," or opinions per year, is the number of opinions in a Justice's career (column
3) divided by the number of Terms served (column 2). It is a general measure of the Jus-
tice's activity.
5. "PPY," or pages per year, is the number of pages of text written by a Justice in his
career divided by the number of Terms served (column 2). (One can generate the total num-
ber of pages by multiplying column 5 and column 2.) "Pages" means the number of pages in
the original edition of each Reporter's volumes. In reprints the starred pagination was used.
Each opinion's length was recorded to the nearest tenth of a page. No attempt has been
made to convert page measurements to words. Although this might be desirable (the Dallas
and Peters volumes, for example, contain more words per page than Cranch or Wheaton),
this subtlety was unnecessary for current purposes.
6. "OPTY," or opportunities, gives the number of cases that (according to the Report-
ers, anyway) came before each Justice for disposition in his career. It includes not only cases
disposed of by signed opinions but also cases disposed of "By the Court" and cases with
dispositions noted by the Reporters but not otherwise attributed. It also includes matters of
practice and procedure that were styled by the Reporters as cases. In some Terms almost all
cases were disposed of by signed opinion. In others the number of unsigned (or short, see
note 3 above) dispositions was substantial. In the 1809 Term, for example, 44 matters were
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styled as cases by Cranch, and 23 of them were handled without signed opinion. As each
Justice had an opportunity to record his views in each matter, however, the table includes
all of them.
7. "OPO," or opinions per opportunity, is column 3 divided by column 6. It measures
each Justice's proclivity to place his views in the written records.
8. "DISOP," or dissenting opinions, records the number of signed dissents a Justice
filed in his career. See note 3 above. An opinion was counted as a dissent if it disagreed in
any particular with the Court's disposition of the case. An opinion agreeing with the disposi-
tion but disagreeing with the reasons was counted as a concurrence.
9. "DISV," or dissenting votes, records the number of times a Justice was noted by
anyone (the Reporter, a colleague, or himself) as having disagreed with the disposition of a
case.
10. "DPY," or-dissents per year, is column 9 divided by column2.
APPENDIX B
THE OPINIONS OF THOMAS TODD (1808-25)
1. Finley v. Lynn, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 238, 252 (1810) (five-line partial dissent in an
action on a bond among partners).
2. M'Kim v. Voorhies, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 279 (1812) (four-line opinion for the Court
holding that a state court may not enjoin the judgment of a federal circuit court).
3. Wallen v. Williams, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 278, 279 (1812) (eight-line concurrence in a
jurisdictional matter).
4. Vowles v. Craig, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 371 (1814) (2.2-page opinion for the Court hold-
ing that the seller under a warranty deed may not later recover land deeded, even though he
is surprised when a survey shows the size of the parcel).
5. Preston v. Browder, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 115 (1816) (3.4-page opinion for the Court
holding that North Carolina law does not authorize entry to claim lands within Indian
reservations).
6. Danforth's Lessee v. Thomas, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 155 (1816) (2.8-page opinion for the
Court repeating the holding of Preston).
7. Ross v. Reed, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 482 (1816) (two-page opinion for the Court that
under Tennessee law a warrant for land, filed with the state, is prima facie evidence of
ownership).
8. Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818) (seven-page opinion for the
Court interpreting several provisions of Tennessee's land law).
9. Brown v. Jackson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 449 (1818) (two-page opinion for the Court
interpreting a deed in light of Kentucky's land laws).
10. Perkins v. Ramsey, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 269 (1820) (seven-page opinion for the Court
interpreting several provisions of Tennessee's land law).
11. Clark v. Graham, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 577 (1821) (three-page opinion for the Court
holding a deed invalid under Ohio land law because not executed in the presence of two
witnesses).
12. Miller v. Kerr, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 1 (1822) (5.3-page opinion for the Court holding
that under Virginia's land laws a patent issued by mistake to a former soldier was insuffi-
cient to terminate the interest of a senior occupier).
13. Watts v. Lindsey's Heirs, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 158 (1822) (4.8-page opinion for the
Court holding that under Ohio's land laws a particular description of land was insufficiently
precise to authorize entry against another party residing there).
14. Riggs v. Tayloe, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 483 (1824) (4.2-page opinion for the Court hold-
ing that when one party to a contract loses his copy, the other party must produce his own
or the first party would be allowed to introduce secondary evidence).
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APPENDIX C
THE OPINIONS OF GABRIEL DUVAL[L] (1812-34)
1. Freeland v. Heron, Lenox & Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 147 (1812) (4.2-page opinion for
the Court holding that a foreign bill of account not objected to for two years permits an
action on account stated, with burden on the defendant).
2. Beatty v. Maryland, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 281 (1812) (7-line [concurring?] opinion con-
cerning the treatment of a final account of an administrator of an orphan's court).
3. Mima Queen & Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 298 (1813) (1.2-page dis-
senting opinion arguing for admissibility of hearsay evidence in suit to obtain declaration of
freedom from slavery).
4. United States v. January, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 572 (1813) (three-page opinion for the
Court holding that funds collected from a bankrupt federal revenue officer must be applied
to the benefit of both of his sureties, not just the first).
5. United States v. Patterson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 575 (1813) (1.1-page opinion for the
Court holding that a bankrupt revenue officer's personal funds must be applied to discharge
his debt to the Treasury).
6. Crowell v. M'Fadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94 (1814) (three-page opinion for the Court
holding that under the 1808 Embargo Act a collector may detain a vessel on suspicion of
intent to violate the Act by unlawful entry, and that the suspicion need not be reasonable).
7. Prince v. Bartlett, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 431 (1814) (one-page opinion for the Court
holding that the United States does not ordinarily have priority in claiming an insolvent's
assets).
8. M'Iver's Lessee v. Walker, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 173, 179 (1815) (2-line [concurring?]
opinion in land boundary case, reading: "My opinion is that there is no safe rule but to
follow the needle[, making allowance for variation, according to practical observation]."
(bracketed portion added in later editions of United States Reports)).
9. United States v. Tenbroek, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 248 (1817) (1.4-page opinion for the
Court holding that the Act of July 24, 1813, imposing a tax on stills, does not tax spirits
already distilled).
10. The Neptune, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 601 (1818) (7.7-page opinion for the Court holding
a vessel forfeit for use of a fraudulent certificate of registry, even though the fraud occurred
before the statute requiring forfeiture was enacted).
11. Boyd's Lessee v. Graves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 513 (1819) 4.3-page opinion for the
Court holding that an oral agreement to abide by a survey of land's borders is binding under
Kentucky's land law even after more than 20 years).
**. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 713 (1819)
("DuvAuL, Justice, dissented.").
12. The Frances & Eliza, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 398 (1823) (two-page opinion for the Court
holding that a British ship is not liable to forfeiture for landing in the United States, de-
spite the navigation act of 1818, if it touched in a prohibited port only for necessary
provisioning).
13. Walton v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 651 (1824) (6.5-page opinion for the
Court holding that a particular statute was not repealed by implication, that a revenue col-
lector's bond does not extinguish his personal liability to pay the proceeds, and that bills of
exceptions were unnecessary in certain cases).
14. Piles v. Bouldin, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 325 (1826) (6.5-page opinion for the Court
holding that under Tennessee law the time required to obtain title to land by adverse pos-
session is seven years).
15. Rhea v. Rhenner, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 105 (1828) (3.5-page opinion for the Court holding
that under Maryland law a woman abandoned by her husband may buy and sell goods and
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property in her own name and is liable for her debts, but may not alienate jointly held real
property;, thus a prior creditor prevails over a purported transferee of real property).
16. Parker v. United States, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 293 (1828) (5.2-page opinion for the Court
holding that a military officer is not entitled to an extra living allowance while at his official
duty station).
17. Nicholls v. Hodges, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 562 (1828) (three-page opinion for the Court
holding that the Court had jurisdiction of an appeal from a court administering a deceased's
estate and then approving the executor's compensation).
18. LeGrand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 664 (1829) (four-page opinion for the Court
holding that under Maryland law a master's testamentary grant of property to a slave enti-
tles the slave to his freedom by necessary implication).
**. Leland v. Wilkinson, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 317, 319 (1832) ("Mr. Justice DUVALL and Mr.
Justice M'Lwm concurred with Mr. Justice SToRY.").
APPENDIX D
THE OPINIONS OF JOHN MCKINLEY (1838-52)
1. M'Kinney v. Carrol, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 66 (1838) (4.7-page opinion for the Court hold-
ing that writ of error does not lie when no federal question was raised in the state court).
2. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102 (1838) (6.3-page opinion for the
Court holding that the statutory bankruptcy priority for debts due the United States ap-
plies to insolvent corporations and their transferees; Justice Story dissented, joined by Jus-
tices McLean, Baldwin, and Barbour, arguing that the statute did not apply to corporations
and that the point had not in any event been raised below, as M'Kinney required).
3. White v. Turk, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 238 (1838) (1.6-page opinion for the Court holding,
on the basis of recent precedent, that a circuit court may certify to the Supreme Court for
decision only such legal questions as divide the court, and not the whole cause).
4. Moncure v. Dermott, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 345 (1839) (eight-page opinion for the Court
holding that under Virginia law the bona fide discounting and sale of a bond cannot make
the bond a usurious contract).
5. Wilcox v. Hunt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 378 (1839) (1.7-page opinion for the Court holding
that in a diversity suit tried in Louisiana, the Louisiana rule allowing hearsay proof of attes-
tation of contracts applies).
6. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 597 (1839) (9.1-page solitary dissent-
ing opinion, arguing that as a matter of constitutional law and "the law of nations" a corpo-
ration chartered in Georgia may not do business'in Alabama even if Alabama's law permits
the transaction).
7. Smith v. Clapp, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 125 (1841) (2.5-page opinion for the Court holding
that there was diversity of citizenship and that the plaintiff properly recovered on a note
under Alabama's law).
8. Levy v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 167 (1841) (three-page opinion for the Court
holding that initial action to implement a confession of judgment clause is not, under Loui-
siana law, a final judgment from which a writ of error lies).
9. United States v. Fitzgerald, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 407 (1841) (3.8-page opinion for the
Court holding that collector of customs could obtain a homestead patent on land, near the
customshouse, that had not been reserved to the government).
**. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 517 (1841) ("Mr. Justice McKNm dis-
ented from the opinion of the court... and Mr. Justice STORY also dissented; both these
justices considering the notes sued upon void.") (this was a significant slavery case).
• 10. Nixdorff v. Smith, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 132 (1842) (five-page opinion for the Court
holding that the lower court must recompute an account between traders in a debt action).
11. Amis v. Smith, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 303 (1842) (5.2-page opinion for the Court holding
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that a judge's requirement that one party post a bond in litigation is not a final, reviewable
judgment, that a suit on a bond must name all the obligors, and that a Mississippi statute
purporting to regulate the terms of bonds and to prohibit appeals from their forfeiture
would not be applied in a diversity case).
12. Randel v. Brown, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 406 (1844) (10-page opinion for the Court hold-
ing that a lien lapses when inconsistent with the terms of a contract and that the subse-
quent possession is fraud).
13. Barry v. Gamble, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 32, 56 (1845) (1.3-page dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Story and Wayne, arguing that a land title was invalid because obtained before
certain public lands had been opened).
14. Dickson v. Wilkinson, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 57 (1845) (two-page opinion for the Court
holding that res judicata precluded an attempt to resist execution on a judgment).
15. Croghan's Lessee v. Nelson, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 187 (1845) (4.2-page opinion for the
Court holding that when it was impractical to ascertain exact boundaries at the time of an
initial entry onto public land, a court will reform the description to carry out the intent of
the locator).
16. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (11.3-page opinion for the
Court holding that as Alabama entered the Union on an "equal footing" with other states, it
had full title to the tidewaters below the usual high water mark at the time of entry).
17. Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464, 477 (1845) (6.9-page dissenting opinion, joined
by Chief Justice Taney, arguing that the construction of a will by a state court was binding
on the Supreme Court).
18. Brown's Lessee v. Clements, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 650 (1845) (nine-page opinion for the
Court holding that the Surveyor General may not divide a section of land irregularly so that
complete quarter-sections cannot be taken up) (Taney, Catron & Daniel, JJ., dissented, and
it was overruled by Gazzam v. Phillips, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 372 (1857)).
19. McFarland v. Gwin, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 717 (1845) (1.5-page opinion for the Court
holding that a marshall must complete, after the expiration of his term, the execution of a
judgment commenced before the expiration).
20. Hickey's Lessee v. Stewart, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 750 (1845) (6.5-page opinion for the
Court holding that the state courts could not award land within the bounds of the Spanish
cession of 1795).
21. Musson v. Lake, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 262 (1846) (5.5-page opinion for the Court holding
that a person demanding payment on a foreign bill of exchange must exhibit the bill).
22. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 452 (1849) (three-page seriatim opinion
concluding that because Congress has unlimited power to exclude or tax entering aliens,
states have no power to do so).
APPENDIX E
A RATING OF THE JUSTICES
"GREAT" (12)
Black Frankfurter Hughes Story
Brandeis Harlan I J. Marshall Taney
Cardozo Holmes Stone Warren
"NEAR GREAT" (15)
Bradley Field W. Johnson Taft
Brennan Fortas Miller Waite
Curtis Harlan II W.B. Rutledge E.D. White
Douglas R.H. Jackson Sutherla.d
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Burton Byrnes Minton Vinson
Butler McReynolds Van Devanter Whittaker
SouRcE: A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HuNDmD JUSTICES 37-40
(1978), reporting the results of a survey of 65 law school deans and professors of
law, history, and political science, in June 1970. Respondents were asked to rate
the Justices on the five-category scale shown above but were given no further
instructions. The Justices are listed alphabetically within each category.
J. Rutledge
Sanford
Shiras
Stewart
Strong
Swayne
Thompson
Todd
Washington
Wayne
B. White
Wilson
Woodbury
Woods
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